Undressing the First Amendment in Public Schools: Do Uniform Dress Codes Violate Students\u27 First Amendment Rights by Barbarosh, Alison M.
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
6-1-1995
Undressing the First Amendment in Public
Schools: Do Uniform Dress Codes Violate
Students' First Amendment Rights
Alison M. Barbarosh
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alison M. Barbarosh, Undressing the First Amendment in Public Schools: Do Uniform Dress Codes Violate Students' First Amendment
Rights, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1415 (1995).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol28/iss4/8
UNDRESSING THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: DO UNIFORM DRESS CODES
VIOLATE STUDENTS' FIRST
AMENDMENT RIGHTS?
We cannot close our eyes to the fact that some of the country's
greatest problems are crimes committed by the youth, too
many of school age.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The National School Boards Association estimates that approxi-
mately "135,000 guns are brought to the nation's 85,000 public schools
every day."2 These weapons are a cause for concern among both par-
ents and school authorities.3 As a result, state governments, school
districts, and individual schools across the nation have employed a va-
riety of means to curb violence on campuses and in classrooms. Such
measures include the use of metal detectors, surprise locker searches,
dogs trained to sniff out guns, and prohibitions against students carry-
ing book bags into classrooms. 4 These measures aim to prevent stu-
dents from hiding weapons in lockers or in their clothing.5 In
California, the San Diego Unified School District even eliminated
school lockers in an effort to curb violence.6 The district claims that
its efforts have reduced crime and violence on its campuses by at least
thirty-five percent.7
Some states and school districts, however, .have gone beyond
metal detectors and eliminating lockers in their attempts to end vio-
l. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 524 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
2. William Celis 3d, Schools Getting Tough on Guns in the Classroom, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 31, 1994, at Al, BS.
3. See Alicia Doyle, Uniforms Seem Popular, but ACLU Objects, L.A. TiMES, Oct. 7,
1994, at B2 (Valley Edition); J. Michael Kennedy & Nicholas Riccardi, Clothes Make the
Student; Schools Decide, L.A. Timus, Aug. 25, 1994, at Al, A23.
4. Schools in Texas utilize dogs to sniff for the presence of guns. Celis, supra note 2,
at Al. The problem of school violence is not limited to large cities. "[P]upils used book
bags to bring two pistols" into school in Kings Mountain, North Carolina, a town of only
8500 people. Id. at B8. The school responded by banning the bags and employing metal
detectors to search students from kindergarten to twelfth grade. Id
5. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995); Celis, supra note 2, at Al.
6. Celis, supra note 2, at B8. School officials also removed lockers at Sheldon High
School in Eugene, Oregon. Id.
7. Id.
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lence in public schools. For instance, in 1992 California amended its
Education Code (Code) to permit school districts to adopt reasonable
dress code regulations prohibiting students from wearing "gang-re-
lated apparel."8 Such apparel may include baggy clothing, 9 baseball
caps,10 bandannas," and overalls with one strap up and one strap
hanging down. 2 In Illinois a school district banned the wearing or
displaying of gang symbols, acts and speech showing gang affiliation,
and conduct furthering gang activity.' 3
While these regulations prohibit certain clothing and accessories,
the Long Beach Unified School District in California took an even
more aggressive approach to regulating apparel by adopting a uniform
dress code policy in all elementary and middle schools.' 4 In an effort
to counter gang influence,15 minimize disruption in schools, 16 and im-
prove the learning environment,' 7 the school district implemented a
mandatory uniform policy beginning with the 1994-1995 school year.'8
Following Long Beach's lead, and at the urging of a student in Kern
County, California, who was concerned about the problems of gang
violence in his neighborhood,' 9 California amended its law to permit
school districts to adopt school-wide uniforms.20
8. See Act of Sept. 24, 1993, ch. 435, § 1, 1993 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995)). Similarly, Tennessee law authorizes education
boards to prohibit students in the sixth through twelfth grades from wearing clothing that
denotes a student's gang affiliation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4215 (Supp. 1994).
9. See Nancy Vogel, Youth Concerned over Gang Clothes Inspired Legislator, SAcrA-
mrENro BEE, May 8, 1994, at A13.
10. Kay Saillant, Survey on Uniforms Gets Low Priority, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1994, at
B1, B7 (Ventura West Edition) (stating that all schools in Ventura, California prohibit
baseball caps).
11. Vogel, supra note 9, at A13.
12. Saillant, supra note 10, at B7.
13. Olesen v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 228, 676 F. Supp. 820, 821 (N.D. Ill.
1987).
14. Guidelines and Regulations for Implementing the Mandatory Uniform Policy in
Grades Kindergarten Through Eight, Long Beach Unified School District (Aug. 11, 1994)
(effective July 12, 1994) (unpublished policy manual, on file with Long Beach Unified
School District) [hereinafter Guidelines].




19. See Vogel, supra note 9, at A13. The student, Jesse Atondo, wanted to introduce
uniforms at his former middle school in Lamont, California. Id,
20. California Education Code § 35183(b) provides:
The governing board of any school district may adopt or rescind a reasonable
dress code policy that requires pupils to wear a schoolwide uniform or prohibits
pupils from wearing "gang-related apparel" if the governing board of the school
district approves a plan that may be initiated by an individual school's principal,
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This Comment addresses whether states, school districts, and in-
dividual schools can implement mandatory uniform dress codes in
public schools without violating students' First Amendment rights.2'
While some dress codes that prohibit students from wearing gang-re-
lated apparel have survived constitutional challenges,22 the California
law that allows school districts to mandate a particular manner of
dress differs vastly from prior laws and may demand stricter constitu-
tional scrutiny. However, the California law has yet to be challenged.
Part II of this Comment discusses the problem of violence on
public school campuses and the development of measures to curb vio-
lence. It also presents the rationale for implementing various policies
targeting gangs and their accompanying violence. Because California
is the first state to implement a uniform dress code law,23 the Califor-
nia law is used as a model in discussing the constitutionality of such
laws. Part III presents a background of the relevant First Amendment
standards applicable to uniform dress codes, the difference between
First Amendment rights of adults and schoolchildren, and a discussion
of gang clothing as merely a source of discomfort in the school envi-
ronment that does not materially affect the educational process. 24
Part IV analyzes uniform dress policies using appropriate standards of
scrutiny and argues that these policies are both overbroad and ineffec-
staff, and parents and determines that the policy is necessary for the health and
safety of the school environment. Individual schools may include the reasonable
dress code policy as part of its school safety plan, pursuant to Section 35294.1.
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995). Similarly, Utah has recognized that the
wearing of certain types of clothing contributes to disruptive behavior and violence. UTAH
CODE ANN. § 53A-15-602 (Supp. 1994). To help prevent classroom disruption and distur-
bances among students, Utah has enacted a law that permits school boards and public
schools to adopt dress codes requiring all public school students to wear a designated uni-
form. Id.
21. See Paul D. Murphy, Note, Restricting Gang Clothing in Public Schools: Does a
Dress Code Violate a Student's Right of Free Expression?, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1321 (1991),
for an analysis of First Amendment challenges to dress codes in public schools. A compre-
hensive analysis of the multiple provisions of the California law permitting public schools
to adopt policies requiring uniforms, CAL. EDUC. CoDEy § 35183, is beyond the scope of
this Comment. Among these provisions are a six-month notice requirement to parents
before a policy may be implemented, id. § 35183(d); the provision of resources to assist
economically disadvantaged students, id.; and a limitation of permissible punishment for
students whose parents choose to opt out of an adopted policy, id. § 35183(f).
22. See, eg., Olesen v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 228, 676 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill.
1987) (holding that antigang rule prohibiting male students from wearing earrings did not
violate students' First Amendment rights).
23. Public School Dress Codes Angering Some Parents (CNN television broadcast,
Aug. 30, 1994) (transcript on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter
Public School Dress Codes].
24. See infra part II.C.
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tive in combatting the presence of gangs and violence in public
schools. Accordingly, this paper concludes that laws permitting uni-
form dress codes are unconstitutional.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF LAWS PERMITTING DRESS CODES IN PUBLIC
SCHOOLS
A. School Violence and Dress Codes Prohibiting Gang-Related
Apparel
The primary purpose of schools is to educate students.2s How-
ever, concerns about violence frustrate this goal by interrupting the
teaching and learning processes.2 6 Authorities attribute much of the
problem of violence in schools to the increasing presence of gangs,27
which often distinguish themselves by particular styles and colors of
clothing. 8 When hostility arises between rival gangs, the gang mem-
bers may identify the targets of their violence by the color of the
clothing associated with a particular rival gang.29 When a nongang
member wears gang-related apparel in the color of a particular gang,
that student may also unwittingly become a target of violence.
30
The Supreme Court has recognized that, in addition to educating
the country's young people,31 schools also have an obligation to pro-
tect students from violence on campus.32 Further, before teachers can
begin educating students, they must establish discipline and maintain
order in the classroom. 33 To this end, states and school districts have
employed a variety of measures.3 One popular approach taken
across the country has been the adoption of dress codes that prohibit
25. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
26. See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995).
27. See, e.g., Legalize School Dress Code, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 16, 1994, at
B-6.
28. See supra notes 8-13 and accompanying text; see also Public School Dress Codes,
supra note 23 (providing example of potential gang violence resulting from students wear-
ing colors associated with particular gangs).
29. Glen Justice, The Uniform of Peace? A Dress Code in Long Beach Could Inspire
Other Schools That Fear Gang Violence, L.A. Tm ws, Feb. 17, 1994, at El, El.
30. Id
31. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring).
32. See id (Powell, J., concurring); see also Rodriguez v. Inglewood Unified Sch. Dist.,
186 Cal. App. 3d 707, 713-15, 230 Cal. Rptr. 823, 826-27 (1986) (discussing school districts'
duty to protect students).
33. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565, 580 (1975) ("Some modicum of discipline and order is essential if the educational
function is to be performed.").
34. See supra notes 4-6, 8-13 and accompanying text.
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students from wearing gang-related apparel at school. 5 These dress
codes have been included in state education codes36 and adopted by
school districts and individual schools. 37 Although school officials
note a decline in violence because of the restrictions, students have
raised First Amendment challenges to dress code requirements.
3 8
Two cases involving constitutional challenges to dress codes
prohibiting students from wearing gang-related clothing are Olesen v.
Board of Education of School District No. 22839 and Jeglin v. San
Jacinto Unified School District.4" In Olesen, a high school student
challenged the constitutionality of a school antigang rule prohibiting
male students from wearing earrings.4' The student argued that his
earring expressed his individuality, and the school regulation violated
his right of free speech and expression under the First Amendment.42
Holding that the school's gang policy did not unconstitutionally in-
fringe on his "freedom to choose his own appearance, 43 the district
court focused on the school's concern for its students' safety and the
related curtailment of gang activity.44 The school board justified its
regulation as an attempt to curtail the violence between competing
gangs that caused students to be reluctant to attend school.45
The Olesen court further stated that, in order for the student to
succeed in his argument that the code was unconstitutional, he must
show that "his conduct intended 'to convey a particularized message
... and ... the likelihood [was] great that the message would be
understood by those who viewed it., "46 The 'court determined that
the student's message in expressing his individuality did not satisfy
35. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1993, ch. 435, § 1, 1993 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4215 (Supp.
1994); Olesen v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 228, 676 F. Supp. 820, 821 n.* (N.D. Ill.
1987).
36. See, e.g., Olesen, 676 F. Supp. at 821 n.*.
37. See, eg., Act of Sept. 24, 1993, ch. 435, § 1, 1993 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995)); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-4215 (Supp.
1994).
38. See, e.g., Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal.
1993); Olesen v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 228, 676 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
39. 676 F. Supp. 820 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
40. 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
41. Olesen, 676 F. Supp. at 821.
42. Id. The student also challenged the regulation on equal protection grounds, but an
equal protection analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment.
43. Id at 823.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 821.
46. Id. at 822 (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)); see infra
part IV.A.1.
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this requirement, taking into consideration the school's concern in
protecting its students.47 Finally, the court noted that the student was
only prohibited from wearing the earring during school hours and on
the school grounds; therefore, he was not completely prevented from
expressing his message.48 The student thus had alternative means of
expression.
Students have also challenged a dress code established under the
California Education Code provision permitting schools to ban gang-
related apparel.49 In Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified School District50 ele-
mentary and middle school students challenged the constitutionality
of a dress code that prohibited clothing identifying any professional
sports team or college.5 The school district adopted the code because
it was concerned that sports-oriented clothing expressed association
with gangs.52 The district court applied the standard originally estab-
lished in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dis-
trict:5 3 The school districtmust demonstrate that the wearing of the
particular clothing would reasonably have caused substantial disrup-
tion of, or material interference with, school activities.54 As for the
elementary schools, the court concluded that the school district failed
to provide evidence of any gang presence and, consequently, there
was no threatened disruption or interference of school activities .5
Therefore, the school district could not impose a dress code in the
elementary schools without violating the students' First Amendment
rights.56 Regarding the middle schools, the district was able to prbve
the presence of gangs, but the court found that their presence was
"negligible. ' 7 Because the district failed to provide evidence that the
presence threatened to disrupt school activities, the court held that the
district could not impose dress code restrictions in these schools.
5 s
47. Olesen, 676 F. Supp. at 822.
48. I& at 823.
49. Act of Sept. 24, 1993, ch. 435, § 1, 1993 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995)); see Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827
F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
50. 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
51. Id.
52. See id. at 1462.
53. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
54. Jeglin, 827 F. Supp. at 1461.
55. Id. at 1461-62.
56. Id.




Under Olesen and Jeglin, it appears that courts will strike down
school dress codes that prohibit students from wearing gang-related
apparel when no actual presence of gang activity exists that interferes
with the orderly operation of the school. Both of these cases, how-
ever, involved challenges to school dress codes that prohibited partic-
ular clothing. Alternatively, instead of banning specific articles, styles,
and colors of clothing, some schools have adopted uniform dress
policies.
B. Implementation of Uniform Dress Codes
In response to the increasing problem of gang activity in public
schools and the difficulty in monitoring changing gang fashions, some
school districts implemented voluntary school uniform policies.
59
Uniforms eliminate the need to determine whether schools can ban a
particular article of clothing because it is gang related. Although uni-
form policies began as voluntary measures, some California schools
and districts have made uniforms mandatory.60 The Long Beach Uni-
fied School District was the first district to choose this approach.6 '
In 1989 the Long Beach Unified School District began a pilot
school uniform program in several schools to determine whether
uniforms could effectively resolve problems of violence.62 After
adopting the program, the district experienced a decrease in ethnic
and racial tensions,63 an improvement in scholastic achievement,' and
a decrease in absenteeism.65 In addition, parents felt more secure that
the students would not be mistaken for gang members while at or on
the way to school because of their clothing.66 Satisfied with these re-
59. As stated in the Los Angeles Times on February 17,1994, school districts in Califor-
nia with voluntary uniform programs include the Los Angeles Unified School District, the
Pomona Unified School District, and the Ravenswood Unified School District. Justice,
supra note 29, at E2.
60. One district in California that has a mandatory uniform dress policy is Long Beach.
Id. at El. Oakland Unified School District currently has a mandatory policy in effect at 24
schools in the district. Telephone Interview with N.Z. Carol, Director of Public Informa-
tion, Oakland Unified School District (Mar. 28, 1995). However, uniforms will be man-
dated districtwide in kindergarten through eighth grade beginning September 1995. l
61. Justice, supra note 29, at El.
62. See Laurie Wilson, A Uniform Look, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Aug. 23, 1994, at
18A, 19A.
63. Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1.
64. Telephone Interview with Richard Van Der Laan, Director of Public Information,
Long Beach Unified School District (Sept. 9, 1994) (improvements in scholastic achieve-




1422 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
suits, the Long Beach school district instituted a district-wide uniform
requirement beginning with the 1994-1995 school year.67 This oc-
curred before California amended its law to permit uniform dress
codes.
C. California Law
The California legislature amended the California Education
Code in 1994 to permit public schools to implement uniform dress
codes. 68 The amended law replaced section 35183 of the Code, which
allowed school districts to prohibit students from wearing gang-re-
lated apparel.6 9 Like the previous section,70 the amendment autho-
rizes a school to implement a uniform dress policy as part of the
school's safety plan, pursuant to the Code.71 A safety plan is "a plan
to develop strategies aimed at the prevention of, and education about,
potential incidents involving crime and violence on the school cam-
pus."72 Enacted in August 1994, the new law took effect throughout
the state on January 1, 1995.
There appear to be two principal reasons for the Code's amend-
ment. First, it is difficult to instruct teachers and school administrators
about the subtleties of identifying constantly changing gang apparel.73
The time required to instruct the administration detracts from the
time necessary to educate students. 74 By instituting a uniform dress
code, the legislature believed that teachers would no longer need to
spend classroom time determining whether particular clothing is gang
related. Instead, they would be able to focus all of their energy on
teaching.
67. See Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1. The mandatory policy applies to all elementary
and middle schools in the Long Beach Unified School District. Id.
68. CAL- EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995).
69. The pre-amended section provided:
The Legislature declares that "gang-related apparel" is hazardous to the health
and safety of the school environment. The governing board of any school district
may adopt reasonable dress code regulations that prohibit pupils from wearing
"gang-related apparel" if the governing board has determined that the regulations
are necessary for the health and safety of the school environment. Upon ap-
proval of the dress code regulations by the governing board of the school district,
individual schools in the school district may adopt reasonable dress code regula-
tions as part of its school safety plan ....
Act of Sept. 24, 1993, ch. 435, § 1, 1993 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at CAL. EDUC.
CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995)).
70. Id.
71. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(b).
72. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35294 (West 1993) (emphasis added).




Second, uniforms will prevent students from being associated
with a particular gang because of their clothing.7' Gang violence on
school campuses often results from warring factions of competing
gangs that are identified by particular styles and colors of clothing.76
While students argue that some styles are worn because they are fash-
ionable-not because of the student's affiliation with a gang77 -ad-
ministrators want to eliminate "mistaken-identity violence. 78 This
occurs, for example, when members of gang X mistake a nongang
member who is wearing a color or style of clothing associated with
gang Y-a rival of gang X-for being a member of gang Y and harass
or assault the student as a result of the misidentification. Administra-
tors assert that school uniforms would protect innocent students from
being targets of gang-related violence both on campus79 and travelling
to and from school.8 0
While the California legislature's motivation for amending the
Code is grounded in the concern for students' safety, the amended law
still must survive constitutional scrutiny in order to be implemented.
Courts have recognized that the First Amendment right to freedom of
speech extends beyond the protection of the spoken and written
word." It also applies to various types of conduct and forms of ex-
pression.82 Clothing has been viewed as a form of expression in many
aspects of life.83 The saying "dress for success," for instance, illus-
trates the notion that the clothing a person wears effects how others
perceive that person, at least in forming a first impression.84 Further,
75. I& § 35183(a)(5).
76. See, e.g., il; Olesen v. Board of Educ. of Sch. Dist. No. 228, 676 F. Supp. 820, 821
(N.D. Ill. 1987); Public School Dress Codes, supra note 23.
77. See Kennedy & Riccardi, supra note 3, at A23.
78. Justice, supra note 29, at El.
79. i&
80. Nancy Vogel, A Change of Uniform- Dress Codes Gain in Public Schools Fearing
Gang Attire, SAcRAmENTo BEE, May 8, 1994, at Al, A13.
81. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989).
82. See, eg., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that flag burning consti-
tuted expressive conduct); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969) (holding that students wearing black armbands to protest U.S. involvement in
Vietnam was "akin to pure speech" and entitled to First Amendment protection); United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (holding that burning draft card constituted expres-
sive conduct).
83. See East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 858 (2d Cir. 1977)
(en banc) ("It may well be, in an age increasingly conscious of fashion, that a significant
portion of the population seeks to make a statement of some kind through its clothes.").
84. See Pat Schudy & David Wolff, Tune Management Helps Teens Get Things Done,
C-i. SuN-TiMEs, Aug. 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Papers File ("Just like
a book, people are also judged by their cover.").
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people often wear clothing in order to express a particular message.8 5
Requiring students to wear a designated uniform deprives students of
the ability to express themselves through their choice of dress. Ac-
cordingly, clothing raises fundamental issues about expression and,
therefore, uniform dress codes must satisfy First Amendment scrutiny
to be constitutionally applied.86
ItI. BACKGROUND ON CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UNIFORM DRESS
CODES
A. Constitutional Standards
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that Congress shall make no law "abridging the freedom of speech.
8 7
This restriction on law-making power applies not only to the federal
government, but also to the states.88 Several interpretations of the
meaning of the First Amendment exist. One such theory, supported
by former Supreme Court Justices Black and Douglas, is that the First
Amendment right is absolute8 9 since the amendment speaks in abso-
lute terms: "Congress shall make no law ... ."90 As such, every form
of speech should be constitutionally protected. 91 Contrast this word-
ing with the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable-but
not all-searches and seizures.92 Arguably, if the framers had wanted
to limit the scope of constitutionally protected speech, they could have
done so in the wording of the First Amendment.
If the Supreme Court accepted this argument, opponents of uni-
form dress codes could assert that any limitation on students' manner
of dress-as a form of expression analogous to speech-would be un-
85. East Hartford Educ; Ass'n, 562 F.2d at 858.
86. See infra part IV for a First Amendment analysis of uniform dress codes.
87. U.S. CONsT. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the
Government for a redress of grievances."
88. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
89. JOHN E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.7, at 943
(4th ed. 1991) (citing Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J.,
dissenting)).
90. U.S. CONSr. amend. I (emphasis added); see also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S.
36,49 (1961) ("[Wje reject the view that... the scope of... [freedom of speech] protection
must be gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment." (citation
omitted)).
91. Under an absolutist theory, public school students' right to wear gang-related
clothing would be constitutionally protected.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 89, § 16.7, at 942.
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constitutional.93 However, a majority of the Supreme Court has never
adopted the absolutist position. 94
While there have been other arguments in favor of unrestricted
free speech,95 the Supreme Court has not accepted such an expansive
view.96 Instead, the Court has designated certain categories of speech
as outside First Amendment protection.97 These categories, however,
are not completely unprotected. 98 The-distinction of whether particu-
lar speech is protected or not depends on the nature of the
regulation.99
Regulations that restrict speech may be either content based or
content neutral. A content-based regulation prohibits speech because
of the ideas or information contained in the speech.100 For such a reg-
ulation to be upheld, there must be a compelling government inter-
est'01 for its implementation, and no less restrictive alternatives must
be available to achieve the government's interest.0 2 Opponents of
uniform dress codes would argue that the codes are content based,
that there are less restrictive alternatives to achieve the government's
interest and, therefore, the codes are unconstitutional.
0 3
Even if the speech involved is within one of the constitutionally
unprotected categories, a content-based regulation may still violate
93. See generally NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 89, § 16.7, at 942-43 (discussing
theory that First Amendment right is absolute).
94. Id. at 943; see also Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 49 (rejecting view of absolute freedom
of speech).
95. NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 89, § 16.6, at 940-41 (stating that other arguments
include individual self-fulfillment, monitoring government's use of power, public enlighten-
ment, and free speech as safety valve for society).
96. Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 49.
97. Id.; see also Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942) ("There are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment
of which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words ...
(footnote omitted)).
98. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
99. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIE, AMERICAN CONsTrruTONAL LAW § 12-2, at
789-94 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing two ways that government might "abridge" speech).
100. I& at 794. An example of a content-based regulation is one that prohibits all pick-
eting within 150 feet of a school, except peaceful picketing of any school involved in a
labor dispute. This prohibition is based on the content of the picketing. See, e.g., Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
101. Courts have recognized that a state's interest in maintaining its educational system
is compelling. Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171,174 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing Bayless v. Martine,
430 F.2d 873, 877 (5th Cir. 1970); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966));
Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
102. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988).
103. See infra part IV.A.2.a for a discussion of uniform dress codes as content based.
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the First Amendment. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,"° the Supreme
Court held that a law was impermissibly content based where it pro-
hibited placement on public or private property of" 'a symbol, object,
appellation, characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a
burning cross or Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable
grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.' "105 Concluding that
the law was unconstitutional, the Court stated that it prohibited other-
wise permissible speech solely on the basis of the subjects that the
speech addressed.10 6 When the government regulates a category of
unprotected speech-such as the fighting words category in
R.A. V. 07 -it generally may not do so in a content-based manner. 08
However, the R.A.V. Court noted an exception: A government can
impose a valid content-based restriction when the basis for the con-
tent discrimination is identical to the reason for not protecting the
entire class of speech involved. 0 9
The second type of regulation is categorized as content neutral.
This type of regulation prohibits speech to avoid an evil unconnected
with the content of the speech.1 0 As a consequence, a content-neu-
tral regulation may interfere with some forms of communication by
restricting the time, place, and manner of the speech."' To be consti-
tutional such a regulation must serve a substantial government inter-
est, be narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and leave open
104. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
105. Id at 2541 (quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990)).
106. Id. at 2542. Another example of an impermissible content-based restriction is one
prohibiting the government from proscribing libel that is critical of the government. I& at
2543.
107. Id at 2542; see also Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572 (" '[Flighting' words fare] those
which by-their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace... [and] such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of
such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality." (footnotes omitted)).
108. See R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543-45.
109. Id. at 2545-46; see infra notes 220-25 and accompanying text. For instance, the
R.A.V. Court stated that the government can criminalize threats of violence directed at the
President since the entire category of threats is unprotected due to the possibility of result-
ing violence. Id. at 2546.
110. See TRIBE, supra note 99, § 12-23, at 977-78.
111. See i at 978. An example of a constitutional time, place, and manner restriction is
one that prohibits the use or operation of any instrument which emits loud and raucous
noises on public streets. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
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alternative channels of communication." Proponents of uniform
dress codes would assert that the codes are content neutral and, there-
fore, they are constitutional." 3
In addition to distinguishing between content-based and content-
neutral regulations, courts also consider the class of persons the regu-
lations target in determining their constitutionality." 4
B. Comparison of First Amendment Rights of Adults to Students
First Amendment rights apply to all United States citizens." 5
The government's ability to curtail some of the rights, however, such
as the right to freedom of speech, may depend on the class of citizens
involved. For instance, the government's power to limit the First
Amendment rights of schoolchildren is broader than its power to limit
similar rights of adults." 6 Yet students are persons under the Consti-
tution and have fundamental rights that the states must respect." 7 In
1969 the Court stated in Tinker v. Des Moines School District"18 that
students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech
or expression at the schoolhouse gate.""i 9
In Ginsberg v. New York, 20 however, the Supreme Court recog-
nized that " 'the power of the state to control the conduct of children
reaches beyond the scope of its authority over adults,'" even where
protected freedoms are invaded. 2 ' In 1985 the Court reaffirmed in
112. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,293 (1984); City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807, 815 (1984).
113. See infra part IV.A.2.b for a discussion of uniform dress codes as content neutral.
114. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); Myers v. Arcata Union High
Sch. Dist., 269 Cal. App. 2d 549,75 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1969); Akin v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal.
App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968), cert. denied 393 U.S. 1041 (1969).
115. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (citing United
States ex reL Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292 (1904)).
116. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629,638 (1968) (citing Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)).
117. Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,511 (1969) (holding that school offi-
cials violated students' First Amendment rights when school adopted rule forbidding wear-
ing of black armbands to protest hostilities in Vietnam since this speech did not cause
disruption).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 506.
120. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
121. Id. at 638 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944)). Several
cases quoted this language from Ginsberg in a public school student context. See, e.g.,
Myers v. Arcata Union High Sch. Dist., 269 Cal. App. 2d 549, 558, 75 Cal. Rptr. 68, 73
(1969); Akin v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161,166,68 Cal. Rptr. 557,560-61 (1968);
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New Jersey v. T.L.O." that the constitutional rights of students in
public schools are not identical to those of adults.'23 The Court held
that, while the Fourth Amendment prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures applies to searches conducted by public school
officials, the school in this situation did not violate a student's fight by
searching her purse because the search was reasonable.124 The Court
stated that schools need not adhere to the requirement that searches
be based on probable cause to believe that the person has violated the
law.125 Instead, the Court concluded that a school's interest in main-
taining order justified the school's search right where there were rea-
sonable grounds for suspecting that the search would result in
evidence that the student violated either the law or the school's
rules. 26
Courts have justified the need to impose more stringent regula-
tions on students by recognizing the existence of disciplinary
problems and safety considerations in a school environment.
1 27
School officials, however, must keep in mind that students retain some
constitutional fights and strike a balance between the students' rights
and the administration's interest in maintaining discipline and a safe
learning environment.'1 The Tinker Court stated that the interest in
suppressing a particular conduct must be more than merely the desire
to avoid the "discomfort and unpleasantness" that accompanies the
conduct' 29 To justify the prohibition of a particular expression,
school officials must show that either the conduct "'materially and
see also Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975) (recognizing that states have broad power
to prescribe and enforce standards of conduct in schools).
122. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
123. See id. (discussing public school student's Fourth Amendment rights). "[S]tudents
within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members of the
population generally." Id. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403
v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (holding that public school could prohibit student from using
lewd and indecent speech during school assembly). Although lewd and indecent speech
may be permissible for adults, First Amendment rights of students in public schools "are
not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings." Id. at 682.
124. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333, 347-48.
125. Id. at 341.
126. Id. at 342.
127. Montalvo v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 21 Cal. App. 3d 323, 330, 98
Cal. Rptr. 593,597 (1971); see also T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 348 (Powell, J., concurring) (discuss-
ing special circumstances in school setting).
128. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 349 (Powell, J., concurring); Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified
Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459, 1461 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
129. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
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substantially interfere[s]'" with appropriate school discipline in the
school's operation 3 ° or impinges on the rights of other students.'3 '
C. Is Gang Apparel Simply a Source of Discomfort or
Unpleasantness?
According to the Court in Tinker, schools may not prohibit a par-
ticular expression simply to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that accompanies the expressed viewpoint. 32 Further, students' First
Amendment rights may not be limited because of an "undifferentiated
fear or apprehension of disturbance" of the educational process. 33
Instead, the speech must materially and substantially interfere with
the school's operation or infringe on the rights of other students."
The Tinker Court concluded that there was no disruption at the
schools because of armbands that students wore to protest U.S. in-
volvement in Vietnam because there were no threats of violence or
actual violence on the campuses. 35
In the case of gang-related apparel, officials must determine if
such clothing materially and substantially interferes with the school's
operation or infringes on other students' rights before imposing
uniforms to restrict such clothing. Long Beach school officials be-
lieved that implementing a uniform requirement could minimize dis-
ruption caused by students' clothing. 136 Moreover, California
legislators believed that teachers and administrators take time away
from teaching to identify and become familiar with constantly chang-
ing gang attire. 37 Instead of focusing on providing an adequate edu-
cation, they are concerned with the potential for classroom violence.
Coupled with students' fear of potential violence, this could interfere
with the ability to learn. If the problem escalates so that schools are
no longer effectively providing an education, the interference could be
both material and substantial. But what stage below significant inter-
ference is sufficient for school officials to take action?
130. Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 508.
134. Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).
135. Id. at 508. See infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
need to determine whether gang violence exists at a school before uniforms may be
adopted.
136. Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1.
137. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(a)(3), (5) (West Supp. 1995).
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The Court in Tinker required a high level of interference or in-
fringement upon the rights of other students.138 The Court found that
wearing armbands did not interfere with other students' rights. 39
Gang clothing may present a different situation. When the clothing
results in violence in the public schools, it infringes upon other stu-
dents' constitutional right to attend a safe campus.'40 This permits
school officials to take action to protect the rights of the students-
but to what extent?
One factor that distinguishes the requirement of uniforms from
the armbands in Tinker is the level of action taken by the school au-
thorities. In Tinker the Court found it relevant that the authorities did
not prohibit the wearing of all controversial symbols.' 4 ' Students con-
tinued to wear political campaign buttons and Nazi symbols. 142 The
only item the school officials prohibited was the black armband worn
in opposition to U.S. involvement in Vietnam.143 California school
officials' approach to gang violence differs. By adopting uniform dress
codes, schools do not single out gang-related apparel; instead, schools
prohibit all clothing that deviates from the designated uniform, re-
gardless of whether the clothing is controversial. 144 This conveniently
eliminates the need to determine whether a particular article or color
of clothing is likely to cause violence.
The Supreme Court has stated that schools are not required to
"tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its 'basic educational
mission.' ,,'4 Further, actual disruption of the educational process is
not necessary in order for school officials to act.' 46 According to
Tinker, the facts must be sufficient for school officials to "forecast sub-
stantial disruption of or material interference with school activi-
ties."' 4 7 This standard should be applied in determining whether
gang-related clothing is sufficiently disruptive to permit the implemen-
tation of uniform dress codes.
138. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
139. Id
140. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(c).
141. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510.
142. 1&
143. Id. at 510-11.
144. See generally CAL. EDuc. CODE § 35183(b) (allowing school districts to adopt dress
code policies that require students to wear school-wide uniforms).
145. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
146. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514; Karp v. Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 175 (9th Cir. 1973).
147. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 514.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF UNIFORM DRESS CODES
For private schools, a uniform dress policy is not unusual.148
Uniforms in public schools, however, are an unfamiliar concept to to-
day's students. California is the first state to pass a law permitting
schools to implement uniform dress codes. 49 The greatest difference
between the previous California law' 50 and the recent amendment to
the Code' 5' is the difference between limiting the type of clothing stu-
dents may wear and mandating the type of clothing students must
wear.1
5 2
To analyze the constitutionality of a uniform dress code, it is nec-
essary to determine whether gang-related clothing is speech or expres-
sive conduct in order to determine the applicable level of scrutiny. 53
If it is considered expressive conduct, a four-part analysis, established
in United States v. O'Brien,54 would be applied to analyze the consti-
tutionality of uniform dress codes.15 5 Alternatively, if gang-related
clothing is pure speech, there are two levels of scrutiny that may apply
in determining whether uniform dress codes are constitutional: (1)
strict scrutiny and (2) intermediate scrutiny. Strict scrutiny applies to
regulations of speech that are content based.156 If a regulation is sub-
ject to a strict scrutiny analysis, it must serve a compelling government
interest and there must be no less restrictive means available to
achieve that interest. 57 An intermediate scrutiny analysis applies to
content-neutral time, place, and manner regulations. 58 To satisfy this
level of scrutiny, the regulation must serve a substantial government
148. See Legalize School Dress Code, supra note 27, at B-6.
149. Public School Dress Codes, supra note 23.
150. Act of Sept. 24, 1993, ch. 435, § 1, 1993 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995)) (authorizing schools to prohibit "'gang-related
apparel' ").
151. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995).
152. Compare Act of Sept. 24, 1993, ch. 435, § 1, 1993 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995)) (law permitted schools to prohibit students
from wearing gang-related clothing) with CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(b) (law permits
schools to adopt uniform dress codes).
153. See, eg., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 403-04 (1989).
154. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
155. See infra part IV.A.1 for a discussion of gang-related clothing as expressive
conduct.
156. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983); see
supra notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
157. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45; see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312,329 (1988); supra
notes 100-09 and accompanying text.
158. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
June 1995] 1431
1432 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
interest, be narrowly tailored to serve the interest, and leave open al-
ternative channels for communication of the ideas.
159
A. Is Gang-Related Apparel Expressive Conduct or Pure Speech?
Determining whether uniform dress codes are constitutional de-
pends on whether the codes regulate expressive conduct 60 or pure
speech.'61  This distinction determines the applicable level of
scrutiny.162
1. Expressive conduct
Although the First Amendment literally prohibits abridging
speech, the Supreme Court has recognized that its protection may ex-
tend beyond the spoken word.' 63 However, First Amendment protec-
tion does not extend to all conduct intended to express ideas.
164
Instead, the Court has recognized that some conduct may be "'suffi-
ciently imbued with elements of communication to fall within the
scope of the First... Amendment[ ]' ,16
To determine whether particular conduct has "sufficient commu-
nicative elements' 166 to warrant First Amendment protection, the
Court considers whether the speaker intended to "convey a particular-
ized message.., and... [whether] the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it."' 67 Examples
of conduct the Court has found to have sufficient communicative ele-
ments include burning an American flag during a protest rally,
68
159. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986); Clark, 468 U.S. at
293.
160. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (establishing a four-
part analysis to determine constitutionality of expressive conduct). Expressive conduct
may also be referred to as symbolic speech. See e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501
U.S. 560, 567 (1991).
161. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06
(1969) (discussing students wearing black armbands in protest of U.S. involvement in Viet-
nam as pure speech).
162. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403-04 (1989) (stating that less stringent
standard applies to regulations that are unrelated to expression than those related to
expression).
163. Id. at 404.
164. Id. (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376).
165. Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974)).
166. Id.
167. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 411 (1974).
168. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
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wearing black armbands to school to protest United States involve-
ment in Vietnam,'169 and nude dancing performed in a lounge.1
70
a. standard for analyzing expressive conduct
The Supreme Court in O'Brien established the standard for ana-
lyzing expressive conduct.' 7 ' In O'Brien the defendant was convicted
for publicly burning his selective service registration certificate,
thereby violating a law that prohibited knowing destruction or mutila-
tion of a draft card. 72 Arguing that the law was unconstitutional,
O'Brien claimed his conduct was symbolic speech within the First
Amendment. He stated that he burned the certificate as a demonstra-
tion of his opposition to the draft and the war in Vietnam. 173 The
Court held that the law was constitutional and set out the following
standard for analyzing statutes regulating symbolic speech:' 74 A regu-
lation is justified if (1) it is within the government's constitutional
power, (2) it furthers an important or substantial government interest,
(3) the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free ex-
pression, and (4) the incidental restriction on First Amendment rights
is no greater than necessary to further that interest.1
7 s
The O'Brien Court applied this standard to the Universal Mili-
tary Training and Service Act, 76 which prohibited the destruction of
draft cards.' 77 First, the Court stated that the law was enacted in ac-
cordance with Congress's power to raise and support armies and to
make laws necessary to achieve that end. 78 In addition, carrying a
draft card provided proof of registration, facilitated communication
between registrants and the draft board, and reminded registrants of
the need to notify the board of changes in personal information. 79
Destroying the certificates would defeat purposes such as the govern-
ment's interest in raising armies. 80 The Court also argued that the
regulation aimed solely to protect these purposes, and did not relate
169. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
170. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
171. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
172. Id at 370.
173. Id. at 376.
174. Id. at 376-77.
175. Id. at 377.
176. Ch. 144, tit. I, § 1(a), 65 Stat. 75 (1951), amended by Act of Aug. 30, 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-152, 79 Stat. 586 (current version at 50 U.S.C. § 462(b)(3) (1988)).
177. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377-82.
178. Id. at 377-78.
179. Id. at 378-79.
180. Id. at 378.
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to suppressing the communicative aspect of O'Brien's conduct-dem-
onstrating opposition to the war and the draft.' 8 ' Finally, the Court
asserted that no less restrictive means existed to ensure the availabil-
ity of the certificates."8 Accordingly, the Court found that O'Brien's
conduct was expressive conduct that violated the Act.'
8 3
A court would apply a similar analysis to determine if wearing
gang clothing is expressive conduct. In order for gang-related apparel
to be considered expressive conduct, it first must be determined
whether students who wear such clothing intend to convey a particu-
larized message. 8' The clothing could express the message of the stu-
dents' affiliation with a particular gang.' 5 It is also arguable that the
clothing, and its indication of gang affiliation, is intended to instill fear
in others.18 6 Accordingly, gang-related apparel could satisfy the re-
quirement of a particularized message.
In addition, the standard requires a great likelihood that those
who view the message will understand it.87 The California legislature
believes that students understand the message conveyed by gang
clothing.' 88 The amendment to the California Education Code states
that students in the public schools are "forced to focus on the threat of
violence and the messages of violence contained in many aspects of
our society, particularly reflected in gang regalia that disrupts the
learning environment."'18 9
The Code's language demonstrates that those who view gang
clothing understand its message,' 9° and gang clothing would likely
have sufficient communicative elements to be considered expressive
conduct. Accordingly, the standard established by the Court in
O'Brien would apply to determine whether a regulation against such
clothing or, more broadly, a law requiring uniforms, is constitutional.
181. Id. at 381-82.
182. 1& at 381.
183. Id. at 386.
184. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 410-11.
185. See Murphy, supra note 21, at 1333.
186. See id.
187. See Spence, 418 U.S. at 411.





b. application of the O'Brien standard
Under O'Brien, the regulation must be within the government's
constitutional power.191 In California the government and school offi-
cials would presumably assert that their authority to regulate school
clothing derives from the state constitution' 12 and the state education
code. 93 The California Constitution provides that all public school
students have a right to attend a safe campus. 94 School officials
therefore have an obligation to ensure the safety of the public schools.
Further, the school officials' authority derives from power granted by
the state legislature.' 95 The legislature has authorized schools to im-
plement safety plans to prevent crime and violence on school cam-
puses. 96 Prior to the Code's amendment, the safety plans could
include a school dress code prohibiting students from wearing gang-
related apparel. 97 Following the amendment,'98 schools could re-
quire students to wear uniforms as part of the school's safety plan.' 99
Accordingly, school officials would have the power to adopt uniform
policies under the California Constitution and the California Educa-
tion Code.
According to the O'Brien Court, the regulation must also further
an important government interest that is unrelated to the suppression
of free speech.2 0 Authorities would assert a government interest in
the requirement to provide safe schools. In fact, the amended law
specifically refers to students' right to be safe at school and the effect
of gang-related apparel on that right.20 ' Accordingly, by implement-
ing uniform dress policies, schools aim to protect students from the
violence associated with gangs, despite the incidental effect of
191. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
192. See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(c).
193. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(a)(1).
194. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 28(c).
195. This is similar to the authority Congress gave to local draft boards in O'Brien to
enforce the Universal Military Training and Service Act, ch. 144, tit. I, § 1(a), 65 Stat. 75
(1951), amended by Act of Aug. 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-152, 79 Stat. 586 (current version
at 50 U.S.C. § 462(b)(3) (1988)). The distinction, however, is that in O'Brien the draft
boards were required to enforce the Act, while the amendment to the California Education
Code permits schools to implement uniform dress codes but does not require them to do
SO.
196. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35294 (West 1993).
197. Act of Sept. 24, 1993, ch. 435, § 1, 1993 Cal. Stat. (codified as amended at CAL.
EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995)).
198. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995).
199. Id § 35183(b).
200. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
201. CAL EDUC CODE § 35183(a)(1), (2).
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uniforms in preventing some nongang members from wearing clothing
they may consider fashionable.
Finally, the O'Brien standard requires that the regulation restrict
students' First Amendment rights no more than necessary to further
the government's interest in providing a safe learning environment.
20 2
While advocates of the amended law2°3 may argue that uniforms are
necessary to provide safe public schools, despite the incidental effect
of restricting students' First Amendment rights, opponents equally
may argued that the restriction is far from incidental. If adopted by a
school, the law would not only prohibit nongang members from wear-
ing gang-related apparel but would prevent all students from expres-
sing their ideas and individuality through their manner of dress. 20 4 In
addition to gang clothing, uniform dress codes prohibit all clothing
that varies from the designated uniform. This is more restrictive than
a mere prohibition against gang-related apparel.
Although providing safe schools is an important government in-
terest, a regulation permitting the implementation of uniform dress
codes is excessive. Therefore, such regulations would be unconstitu-
tional under a First Amendment analysis of expressive conduct.
2. Pure speech
A court instead may decide that gang clothing is pure speech;
therefore, a uniform dress code regulates pure speech, not expressive
conduct. If wearing gang apparel constitutes pure speech, a court
must determine whether uniform dress codes are content based or
content neutral to decide the appropriate level of scrutiny.
a. uniform dress codes as content based
The 1994 amendment to the Code 05 implies that the law's in-
tended purpose is to protect students from the increasing violence on
public school campuses. °6 The law provides that individual schools
202. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
203. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 294-97.
205. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183.
206. See id. § 35183(a)(1) ("[C]hildren in many of our public schools are forced to focus
on the threat of violence and the messages of violence contained in many aspects of our
society, particularly reflected in gang regalia that disrupts the learning environment.").
"The adoption of a schoolwide uniform policy is a reasonable way to provide some protec-
tion for students." Id § 35183(a)(5). Further, the law provides that "[t]o control the envi-
ronment in public schools to facilitate and maintain an effective learning environment and
to keep the focus of the classroom on learning and not personal safety, schools need the
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may adopt a uniform dress code pursuant to school safety plans, 0 7
stating that "'[g]ang-related apparel' is hazardous to the health and
safety of the school environment."2 °0 Despite permitting schools to
prohibit clothing other than gang-related apparel, the law emphasizes
the message that gang-related apparel sends to other students-the
threat of violence. Arguably, it is a content-based law because its fo-
cus is on the elimination of particular clothing that may detrimentally
effect the learning environment.
If it is content based, the law must satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis
to survive: There must be a compelling state interest and no less re-
strictive alternatives to further that interest.20 9 Because this is a high
standard, laws rarely survive this level of scrutiny.21
Courts have found that states have a compelling interest in main-
taining an educational system.2 1 Further, states have an interest in
providing an effective learning environment. 212 Accordingly, courts
consider regulations that promote order within the educational system
reasonable, even when they infringe on students' freedom of
speech.213 When violence plagues a campus to the extent that it af-
fects learning, the state cannot achieve its purpose of educating stu-
dents.214 Thus, the state has a compelling interest in providing not
only an effective learning environment but a safe one as well.
Uniforms may be part of an overall attempt to prevent violence
on campus, one aspect of maintaining an effective educational system.
When violence is no longer the central concern of school administra-
tors, teachers can focus on the state's goal of educating students. It
thus appears that a law requiring students to wear uniforms, in order
to prevent the negative effects of gang clothing and its accompanying
violence, would satisfy the first part of the strict scrutiny analysis.
authorization to implement uniform clothing requirements for our public school children."
Id. § 35183(a)(6).
207. See id § 35183(b); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35294 (West 1993) (providing that
"a 'safety plan' means a plan to develop strategies aimed at the prevention of, and educa-
tion about, potential incidents involving crime and violence on the school campus").
208. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(a)(2) (West Supp. 1995).
209. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988).
210. Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1852 (1992).
211. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 350 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring); Karp v.
Becken, 477 F.2d 171, 174 (9th Cir. 1973) (citing Bayless v. Martine, 430 F.2d 873, 877 (5th
Cir. 1970); Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966)).
212. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(a)(1).
213. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744,748 (5th Cir. 1966) (describing rules such as assign-
ment of students to particular classes, forbidding unnecessary discussions in classroom, and
prohibiting conversations between students as reasonable regulations).
214. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring).
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However, a state must not only have a compelling interest but
also must demonstrate that no less restrictive alternatives are avail-
able to achieve the state's goal.215 This presents the issue of whether
dress codes that prohibit gang-related clothing are less restrictive than
uniform dress codes. The difference is simply that the former prohib-
its only the particular clothing that allegedly leads to violence on cam-
pus, while the latter mandates exactly what clothing a student must
wear.
Some have argued that uniform requirements are actually less re-
strictive than bans on particular clothing and colors216 -uniform re-
quirements supposedly treat everyone equally. 17 However, there is a
manifest difference between prohibiting particular clothing and man-
dating what clothing a student must wear. In comparison, a uniform
dress code restricts students from wearing a wider variety of clothing
than a mere prohibition against gang-related clothing. The former
prohibits students not only from wearing gang-related clothing, but
also clothing of any kind that varies from the designated uniform.218
It is apparent that a prohibition against gang-related clothing is a less
restrictive alternative 19 and, consequently, a uniform dress code
should fail a strict scrutiny analysis.
Even so, a content-based restriction may be permissible if it falls
within the exception stated in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.a 0 Where an
entire class of speech is not protected by the First Amendment, a con-
tent-based restriction on a subcategory of such speech may be valid if
it is restricted for the same reason the entire class is not protected. 21
Proponents of clothing restrictions might argue that gang-related
clothing is an unprotected category because it falls under the fighting
words doctrine or incites unlawful conduct. 2 If school districts pro-
hibit gang clothing because it tends to incite an immediate breach of
the peace, it is likely that courts would uphold regulations prohibiting
215. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 329.
216. California State Senator Phil Wyman, Wyman Uniform Bill Sails Out of Assembly,
News Release (July 7, 1994) (on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
217. Id.
218. See infra part IV.C for a discussion of an overbreadth analysis.
219. See Murphy, supra note 21, for an analysis of dress codes prohibiting gang-related
apparel.
220. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
221. Id. at 2545.
222. See Murphy, supra note 21, at 1350-53, for a thorough analysis of the fighting
words doctrine and incitement to commit unlawful conductas they apply to gang-related
clothing. Murphy concludes that dress codes prohibiting gang-related apparel would likely
survive both analyses. Id. at 1353.
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such clothing, even though they are content based.2 3 However, if no
exception applies, it is likely that uniform dress codes would fail a
strict scrutiny analysis since less restrictive means are available for
achieving safe campuses.
b. uniform dress codes as content neutral
Proponents of school uniforms, however, would argue that a uni-
form dress code is content neutral since its goal is to provide a safe
and effective learning environment through a means unrelated to the
speech's content. According to the amendment's legislative findings,
educators believe that school dress significantly influences student be-
havior.224 In Long Beach, California, where a pilot uniform policy
was in effect at several schools during the 1993-1994 school year, 5
administrators concluded that uniforms reduced ethnic and racial ten-
sions,226 bridged socioeconomic differences between students,227 im-
proved students' self-respect,228 decreased absenteeism,229 and
improved academic performance23a0 While a uniform dress code may
interfere with some types of communication, such as students expres-
sing their gang affiliation, the law's purpose is to enhance the overall
learning environment.
The Court in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres231 discussed a
similar analysis. The Renton Court held that an ordinance prohibiting
adult movie theaters from locating within 1000 feet of various sites did
not target the content of the films shown at the theaters, but targeted
the secondary effects of the theaters on the surrounding commu-
223. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (discussing states' ability to
"forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force ... where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such ac-
tion"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (" '[D]amned racketeer'
and 'damned Fascist' are epithets likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and
thereby cause a breach of the peace.").
224. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(a)(7) ("Schools that have adopted school uniforms ex-
perience a 'coming together feeling,' greater school pride, and better behavior in and out
of the classroom.").
225. Guidelines, supra note 14, at 1. The policy became mandatory at the beginning of




229. Van Der Laan Interview, supra note 64.
230. Id (improvements in scholastic achievement were noticed at some schools in
district).
231. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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nity. 3 2 The city enacted the ordinance to prevent crime, maintain
property values, and protect the quality of the city's neighborhoods,
"not to suppress the expression of unpopular views." 3 Similarly, ad-
vocates of the uniform law would focus on secondary effects, arguing
that its purpose is to promote the safety of public school campuses,
not to suppress students' expression of gang affiliation or other cloth-
ing-related expression.
If courts consider the amendment to the Code content neutral,
then they would apply a time, place, and manner analysis234 rather
than a more stringent strict scrutiny analysis. Courts would uphold
the regulation if it was designed to serve a substantial government
interest, was narrowly tailored to serve that interest, and alternative
means of communication were available.3 5
The analysis of whether the law serves a substantial government
interest would be similar to that discussed above,236 namely, the pur-
pose of the law is to provide safe public schools-a right guaranteed
to students under the California Constitution.3 7 Eliminating gang vi-
olence on campus is a means of promoting this right. The Court in
Renton held that the city's desire to preserve the quality of urban life
was a satisfactory interest?3 8 Similarly, a school's desire to provide a
safe learning environment should be a sufficiently substantial interest.
In addition, the law must be narrowly tailored to serve the gov-
ernment's interest.239 It does not have to be the least restrictive
means of achieving the government's interest; it just must be reason-
able and not "burden substantially more speech than necessary."' 0
Uniform dress codes, however, burden much more speech than neces-
sary to prevent gang violence. The uniform law permits schools to
prohibit not only gang-related clothing, but all clothing that deviates
from the school-imposed uniform.
232. Id. at 47.
233. Id. at 48.
234. Id. at 47.
235. Id. (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984); City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 807 (1984); Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647-48 (1981)).
236. See supra part IV.A.I.b.
237. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(c).
238. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50.
239. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293.
240. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S. Ct. 2711, 2722




Moreover, to be permissible, the law must leave open alternative
means of communication.24 The Court in Renton found that the law,
which restricted the location of adult theaters, left open adequate al-
ternative means of communication242 because more than five percent
of the land in the entire city remained available for use by the
theaters.2
43
A uniform dress code similarly does not completely prohibit stu-
dents from wearing their desired clothing. The restrictions would ap-
ply only on the school campus, leaving students free to wear other
clQthing off campus. But the real issue is whether uniform dress codes
would leave open alternative avenues of communication on school
premises.244 In addition to precluding students from wearing fashion-
able clothing, the law would also prohibit students from wearing cloth-
ing that bears a message or expresses a student's ideas on any issue.245
Further, school officials may not tolerate even minor modifications of
students' uniforms, such as wearing distinct shoelaces or jewelry.246 It
is possible that the only alternative means of communication available
would be oral, and even this may be limited in a school context.247
Even if generally characterized as content neutral, the law still
risks being declared unconstitutional because-of its inclusion of a con-
tent-based provision.24 The Code amendment provides that a school
district may adopt or rescind a reasonable dress code policy that pro-
241. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 47 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789, 807 (1984); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 647-48 (1981)).
242. Id. at 53.
243. Id. The Court concluded this was adequate despite respondents' argument that
some of the stated land was already occupied by existing businesses and the rest was either
not available or not "'commercially viable.'" Id. at 53-54.
244. See infra text accompanying notes 292-97.
245. See infra text accompanying notes 294-97.
246. See, e.g., Van Der Laan Interview, supra note 64. California law, however, provides
that a school's uniform policy shall not preclude students who participate in nationally
recognized youth organizations from wearing organization uniforms when that organiza-
tion has a scheduled meeting. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(g). The Long Beach policy com-
plies with this provision. See Guidelines, supra note 14, at 4.
247. A discussion of a school's ability to limit its students' freedom of oral expression is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
248. See, e.g., CAl. EDUC. CODE § 35183(b). The prior statute, restricting gang-related
apparel, also contained this language. Act of Sept. 24, 1993, ch. 435, § 1, 1993 Cal. Stat.
(codified as amended at CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995)).
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hibits students from wearing gang-related apparel. 249 As previously
stated, this prohibition is content based since it regulates speech ac-
cording to the message it sends-only prohibiting students from wear-
ing clothing that is gang related." °
Even if a uniform rule is in effect, gang members may attempt to
express their gang affiliation through other means 251 For instance,
gang members may try to wear baggy uniforms or make themselves
known by wearing particular shoelaces. 2 However, according to
Richard Van Der Laan, the Director of Public Information of the
Long Beach Unified School District, if police inform school officials
that particular clothing is gang attire, the school will not permit the
clothing to be worn.23 This restriction would be based on the authori-
ties' perception that the clothing is gang related, and again the restric-
tion would be content based.
Finally, according to former California State Senator Phil Wy-
man,254 schools and parents are given the choice of whether to imple-
ment a uniform dress code "based on local conditions of crime,
classroom discipline or whatever.' '2 5 This approach to the law closely
resembles the argument that the legislature generally enacted it to
provide a safe and effective learning environment.256 However, it pro-
vides few limitations to the purposes for which a school may adopt a
uniform dress code. While the law mentions benefits other than re-
ducing violence on campus,257 it specifically states that the governing
board of a school district may adopt a school-wide uniform if the
board determines that the "policy is necessary for the health and safety
249. CAL EDUC. CODE § 35183(b). This provision is the equivalent of the earlier law
permitting schools to implement dress codes prohibiting gang-related apparel. See Mur-
phy, supra note 21, for a First Amendment analysis of these dress codes.
250. See Murphy, supra note 21, for a discussion of the constitutionality of dress codes
prohibiting gang-related clothing. Inkaddition to being content based, a provision permit-
ting schools to prohibit gang-related clothing would also risk being declared vague. For a
vagueness analysis of such provisions, see id. at 1355-56.
251. Michel Marriott, Uncool For School, N.Y. Tiws, Nov. 14, 1993, § 9, at 1, 9. Lau-
rence Steinberg, professor of psychology at Temple University, believes that "students
[will] always find a way, perhaps subtle, to assert their individuality and group identities
through what they wear.... ." Id
252. See Van Der Laan Interview, supra note 64.
253. Id.
254. Former Senator Wyman authored SB 1269, the uniform dress code bill that
amended the California Education Code. California State Senator Phil Wyman, Governor
Signs Wyman's Uniform Bill, News Release (Aug. 23, 1994) (on file with Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter Governor Signs Wyman's Uniform Bill].
255. Id (emphasis added).




of the school environment.""2  This introduces the issue of whether
the law will reduce the violence currently plaguing our nation's public
schools-the stated purpose of the law.
B. Effectiveness of Uniform Dress Codes
Opponents of the law may raise two arguments regarding the ef-
fectiveness of the California uniform dress law, regardless of whether
the law is content based or content neutral. The first argument is that
the law is underinclusive-it focuses solely on violence caused by the
presence of gangs on campus and neglects to address the other
problems that lead to violence. The second argument is that no rela-
tionship exists between uniforms and violence. 259 This argument is
more powerful because, if accepted, it determines that the law is inef-
fective and therefore unconstitutional.
1. Underinclusiveness
Opponents of the amendment to the Code may argue that it is
underinclusive since it ignores all causes of violence other than gangs.
The Court discussed the issue of underinclusiveness in City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres.2 60 In Renton respondents argued that the law
failed to regulate other types of adult businesses that were likely to
produce secondary effects similar to those caused by adult theaters.26'
In response the Court stated that the city's choice of addressing the
problems created by a particular type of business did not mean that
the city had "singled out" adult theaters for discrimination.262 The
ordinance was a valid governmental response to the serious problems
created by the theaters.
2 63
Similarly, opponents of uniform dress codes may argue that nu-
merous activities and problems lead to campus violence. The violence
is not limited to warfare between competing gangs. The law, however,
focuses solely on the problems created by the presence of gangs and
their distinct apparel, failing to address other causes of violence. Fol-
258. l& § 35183(b) (emphasis added); see infra notes 266-69 and accompanying text.
259. See generally California Senate Floor Analysis of SB 1269, 1993-1994 Regular Sess.
(July 7, 1994) (Arguments in Opposition) (unpublished analysis, on file with Loyola of Los
Angeles Law Review) [hereinafter California Senate Floor Analysis] (expressing view that
"there is no sound evidence that uniforms prevent gang violence [or the] carrying of
weapons").
260. 475 U.S. 41, 52-53 (1986).
261. lIt at 52.
262. 1& at 52-53.
263. Id at 54.
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lowing the analysis of the Court in Renton, advocates of uniform dress
codes could respond that the government and schools are attacking
the problem of violence one step at a time. By eliminating clothing
that distinguishes students as gang members or permits students to
hide weapons in their clothing, the schools are taking steps to rid cam-
puses of the violence that interferes with the schools' educational pur-
pose. In the future the government may find additional means it
believes will succeed in making the campuses safer.2 " For now, advo-
cates would argue that requiring students to wear designated uniforms
"represents a valid governmental response to . . . [a] 'serious
problem[ ].' "265
Moreover, according to the language of the California law,
schools may adopt a uniform policy only if they determine that such a
policy is necessary for the safety of the school environment.266 There-
fore, the regulation may not permit all schools to implement a uni-
form dress code. Instead, school districts first need to prove that a
problem of violence exists at the particular school before adopting a
uniform policy.267 If no such problem exists, it would be difficult for
the school to justify the need for such a drastic measure. In addition,
if a school adopts a uniform policy that successfully eliminates campus
violence, at what point would the school be required to terminate the
policy because it is no longer justified?
2. No relationship exists between uniforms and violence
Regardless of whether uniform laws are categorized as content
based and subject to a strict scrutiny analysis, or content neutral and
264. Educating students about gangs and violence may be another measure schools take
in an attempt to eliminate violence on campus. As part of the School Safety Plan, the
California Education Code provides for the development of "strategies aimed at the pre-
vention of, and education about, potential incidents involving crime and violence on the
school campus." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35294 (West 1993) (emphasis added).
265. Renton, 475 U.S. at 54 (quoting Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S.
50, 71 (1976)).
266. The amended law provides: "The governing board of any school district may adopt
or rescind a reasonable dress code policy that requires pupils to wear a schoolwide uniform
... if the governing board of the school district ... determines that the policy is necessary
for the health and safety of the school environment." CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(b) (West
Supp. 1995) (emphasis added); see also California Senate Floor Analysis, supra note 259
("Implementation [of a uniform policy at a school] is contingent upon the governing
board's determining that the policy is necessary for the health and safety of the school
environment.").
267. This situation would be similar to the district court's discussion in Jeglin v. San




subject to an intermediate scrutiny analysis, the laws must relate to
the ends they seek to achieve.268 Before they adopt such policies,
schools should consider whether uniforms will succeed in reducing the
amount of violence on campuses. Opponents of the Code's amend-
ment, such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), argue that
no empirical evidence shows that the improvements noticed by the
Long Beach Unified School District were a result of the voluntary uni-
form program.269 Further, the benefits do not show a direct link be-
tween school uniforms and a decrease in gang violence.270 If no
relationship exists, then the law would fail both a strict scrutiny analy-
sis and an intermediate scrutiny analysis because it would be impossi-
ble to effectively argue that the law as enacted achieved its stated
goal.
Although the language of the California law states that its pur-
pose is to help reduce violence in schools, 71 various interpretations
may lead to confusion regarding the permissibility of uniforms. As
previously mentioned, Phil Wyman, former state senator and author
of the uniform bill, stated that schools and parents could choose to
adopt a uniform policy "based on local conditions of crime, classroom
discipline or whatever." 272 When Long Beach adopted its mandatory
uniform policy, the school district based the decision upon the results
of a pilot program within the district 27 3 The pilot program not only
enhanced safety274 but also promoted nonsafety factors such as bridg-
ing socioeconomic differences among students, 75 promoting good
behavior,276 and improving students' self-respect.277  While these
nonviolence-related benefits may enhance the learning environment,
it is doubtful that they are the factors the California legislature in-
tended to be considered in deciding whether to institute a uniform
268. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) ("Let the end be
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropri-
ate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.").
269. See California State Assembly Comm. on Educ., Hearing Report on SB 1269, at 2
(June 22, 1994) (unpublished analysis, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
270. Id.
271. CAT_ EDUC. CODE § 35183(a).
272. Governor Signs Wyman's Uniform Bill, supra note 254. The constitutional analysis
in this Comment focuses on the implementation of uniform dress codes for the purpose of
decreasing violence in public schools.
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policy. Further, less intrusive means than uniforms may achieve these
benefits.
Since the law focuses on school violence, schools should imple-
ment a uniform policy solely to avert violence, not to achieve nonvi-
olence-related benefits.278 But are uniforms even the solution to
violence? If a student, gang member or not, wants to bring a weapon
to school, a uniform is not going to prevent the student from doing so.
Although it has been asserted that students often conceal weapons by
wearing baggy clothing, such as jumpsuits and overcoats,279 a uniform
will not prevent a student from concealing a weapon in a backpack or
cut-out book.280 Children are encouraged and taught to be creative
from an early age, and they may be creative in finding ways to bring
weapons to school.
Uniforms also will not prevent students from joining gangs,28' the
groups commonly associated with campus violence. In order for
schools to eliminate gang violence on campus, they should focus on
the core of the problem-students' association with gangs-not the
resulting violence or the mere meaning of certain clothing. To pre-
vent gang association, teachers, administrators, and parents should fo-
cus on children's environments outside the school, not the clothing
they wear to school. For instance, if the family unit is strengthened,
children may not feel the need to seek companionship through
gangs.' 3 Consequently, schools would be relieved of some of the vio-
lence that is associated with gangs, resulting in safer campuses, not
just the image of a safe school environment.
In addition to not solving the problem of violence, uniforms may
actually create more problems. The California law contains an opt-
out provision whereby parents may choose to exempt their children
from a school's uniform policy.283 Assuming a student's parents do
not want their child to wear a uniform, consider the effect on the stu-
dent when the student's friends are all wearing uniforms and the stu-
278. See supra notes 64-65, 275-79 and accompanying text, for examples of nonvi-
olence-related benefits.
279. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(a)(4).
280. See Celis, supra note 2, at B8 (" 'There are a million other ways [to bring a weapon
to school].'" (quoting 13-year-old Owen Brice, student at Alexander Graham Middle
School)).
281. Vogel, supra note 80, at A13.
282. See generally Zoltan L. Simsay, Individual Freedoms Lose if School Uniforms Win,
SAN DIEGO UNioN-TRIB., Oct. 20, 1994, at B-11 ("The issue of gangs and gang violence
extends far deeper than what one wears in school. The problem is a socioeconomic one
and must be addressed at home and on the streets.").
283. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(e).
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dent stands out in school. If classmates ridicule the child, the student
may give in to peer pressure and join the uniform program to avoid
humiliation. This teaches students conformity, not individuality, and
may weaken their ability to make individual choices. Further, it fos-
ters "'a sterile, uncreative environment' "2" during a period in a
child's life when creativity should be encouraged.
If, instead of reducing violence in public schools, uniforms create
more problems, schools should not adopt uniform dress codes. More-
over, if uniform requirements bear no relation to a reduction in vio-
lence, then the California law permitting schools to implement
uniforms would be unconstitutional.
C. Overbreadth
In addition to being unconstitutional for failing to satisfy the ap-
propriate level of scrutiny, uniform dress codes may also be unconsti-
tutional due to overbreadth. A statute is overbroad if, in addition to
proscribing activities that constitutionally can be regulated, it also
proscribes speech or conduct that is protected by the First Amend-
ment guarantee of free speech.285 An overbreadth challenge can be
applied on a case-by-case basis or used to facially attack a statute.2 6
If a court, considering a facial attack, concludes that a statute would
deter people from engaging in protected speech, it will strike down
the entire statute.2 7 Mere overbreadth, however, will not be suffi-
cient to strike down a law. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,288 the Supreme
Court stated that, for facial invalidation of a statute primarily directed
at conduct rather than pure speech, the overbreadth must be both real
and substantial in relation to its legitimate sweep.2 9 However, if a
court concludes that a statute would not deter speech that is constitu-
tionally protected, the court will uphold the law and allow it to be
applied on a case-by-case basis.290 Thus, the concern regarding an
284. Robert Frank, In U.S., Uniforms Are Back in Favor, INT'L HERALD TRM., Oct. 11,
1994, at 17, 19 (quoting Eugene Kinsey, attorney who filed federal lawsuit against Long
Beach Unified School District for its uniform policy but withdrew suit after California law
was passed, deciding it provided parents with adequate options).
285. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940).
286. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 89, § 16.8, at 947.
287. I&
288. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
289. Id. at 615.
290. See iL at 615-16.
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overbroad law is that it will have a "'chilling effect'" on free
speech.2
91
The issue presented here is whether a uniform dress code would
survive an overbreadth attack. Paul Murphy analyzed an overbreadth
challenge to restrictions against wearing gang attire.2 2 Murphy ar-
gued that
[v]ery little protected speech will be chilled by the dress
codes because students can still express messages by their
choice of dress.... Thus, the chilling effect will only occur
when students choose not to wear a particular article of
clothing because they fear it may also express a gang
message.... This overbreadth is not substantial.293
The circumstances change, however, when the statute goes be-
yond the mere restriction of gang clothing. When schools tell students
precisely what clothing they must wear to school, they deprive stu-
dents of any opportunity to express a message through their choice of
dress. According to the ACLU, uniform dress codes infringe upon
students' free speech rights and "cut off a significant avenue of polit-
ical expression for students." 294 The ACLU expressed the concern
that students could not wear T-shirts with messages such as "Just Say
No to Drugs" or "Real Women Love Jesus. '295 In effect, students
would lose their choice of dress entirely. This level of overbreadth is
substantial, much more so than a typical dress code that prohibits only
specific items.
Further, under the statutes that merely restrict gang clothing, stu-
dents might have the opportunity to rebut the presumption that their
clothing was gang related in order to wear their desired clothing. 96
With the implementation of a uniform dress code, however, students
can no longer rebut this presumption. The only circumstance in which
students might continue to express themselves through clothing would
be if their parents chose to opt out of the uniform program,297 assum-
291. See, eg., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194,2201 (1993) (quoting majority opin-
ion of Rehnquist, CJ.).
292. Murphy, supra note 21, at 1353-55.
293. Id at 1355.
294. California Senate Floor Analysis of SB 1269, at 3 (Apr. 14, 1994) (Arguments in
Opposition) (unpublished analysis, on file with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
295. Id
296. See Murphy, supra note 21, at 1356.
297. See California Education Code § 35183(e) (West Supp. 1995), for an example of an
opt-out provision. If a parent chose to opt out, and the state also had a law restricting
students from wearing gang-related clothing, an analysis of the potential overbreadth of
the restriction would be necessary. The California law permits schools to restrict gang-
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ing such an alternative was available. Whether a particular article of
clothing is gang related would be irrelevant if a school requires a par-
ticular uniform.
Finally, Murphy argued that
[n]ongang members may be forced to change their wardrobe
or their color scheme, or may be prohibited from wearing
certain gang-related clothing. This does not seem inherently
substantial in light of what a dress code is trying to do-es-
tablish a safe and effective learning environment. Even if
some are prohibited from wearing particular articles of cloth-
ing, this seems to fall "within the scope of otherwise valid...
laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally un-
protected conduct" that gang regalia may represent.298
The questionable aspect of this argument is the effectiveness of the
state's approach in achieving its interest. While limiting the clothing a
student wears to school may reduce the overt presence of gangs, it
does not eliminate the actual existence of gangs and violence in
schools.
Applying this argument to uniform dress codes, even if a court
determined that the uniform laws were not substantially overbroad,
the issue remains whether the state's approach to the problem effec-
tively achieves its goal. While a state may have a legitimate interest in
providing a safe and effective learning environment, the means
adopted-implementing uniform dress codes-may be too remote
from the ends the state wishes to achieve. Many educators agree that
uniforms are not going to solve the problems in public schools.299 A
principal of a school in Los Angeles raised the question, "'The apple
is rotten so you're going to shine the top and that's going to make a
difference?' "300 Instead of addressing the problem of gangs and their
accompanying violence, schools are further suppressing the issue in an
attempt to present an image that schools are safe.3 °1 In so doing, the
related clothing or require students to wear uniforms. See Murphy, supra note 21, at 1353-
55, for application of the overbreadth doctrine to prohibitions of gang-related clothing.
298. Murphy, supra note 21, at 1354-55 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
299. See Vogel, supra note 80, at A13 ("[S]ome educators call uniforms a Band-Aid that
cannot make public school students read better or resist joing [sic] gangs.").
300. 1L (quoting Dyhan Lal, Carson High School principal).
301. See supra part IV.B.2 for a discussion of the relationship between uniforms and
violence.
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legislature and school boards appear to drastically infringe upon stu-
dents' rights.
V. CONCLUSION
The 1994 amendment to the California Education Code autho-
rizes public schools to implement uniform dress code policies in an
attempt to stop the problem of gang violence that currently plagues
the State's schools.32 The law permits individual schools to go be-
yond the popular method of prohibiting students from wearing gang-
related clothing and require a uniform.30 3 While restrictions against
gang-related apparel have successfully met challenges,304 the constitu-
tionality of uniform dress codes, such as those permitted by the Cali-
fornia amendment, has yet to be questioned.
A student or parent who challenges the law will have to show that
it unnecessarily infringes on students' First Amendment rights in a
way that is more restrictive than a regulation prohibiting gang-related
clothing. While states and school officials do have broad discretion in
formulating regulations necessary to provide a safe learning environ-
ment,3 5 the United States Constitution limits their power. Under an
analysis of uniform dress codes either as expressive conduct or pure
speech, dress codes exceed this limit and violate students' First
Amendment rights. Further, by permitting schools to implement uni-
form dress codes that prohibit all clothing that deviates from the des-
ignated uniform, the California law is also overbroad.
Fundamentally, both uniforms and regulations prohibiting gang-
related clothing make the same assumption-that campus violence re-
sults from the type of clothing that students wear. Although clothing
may be a factor, such as when a student wears a color or style associ-
ated with a particular gang, it is not the cause of the violence. Gangs,
not clothing, cause violence.
Instead of focusing on clothing, the State should direct its efforts
at discouraging students from joining gangs. This includes not only
teaching them the importance of an education, but also trying to im-
prove the conditions of students' lives outside the school environment.
302. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 35183 (West Supp. 1995).
303. Idi
304. See, e.g., Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal.
1993).
305. Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1966). States have a compelling




If the family unit is weak, children may tend to seek companionship
from their peers and, ultimately, they may look to gangs to serve as
substitute families. However, if children choose not to join gangs,
gang presence at the schools could decrease and, as a result, the prob-
lem of gang violence in public schools would diminish.
Uniforms, on the other hand, merely seem to mask the underly-
ing problem; they are not the ultimate solution. They will neither de-
ter students from joining gangs nor will they prevent gang violence.
They also will not prevent gang members from expressing their gang
affiliation through other means, such as hand signals or hairstyles. As
one student commented, "'We'll still get jumped. This is the inner
city, it's not going to change. You have to change the neighborhoods
first; put the kids behind bars who belong there.' "306
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306. Justice, supra note 29, at E2 (quoting 13-year-old Meagan Kindler, student at
Franklin Middle School in Long Beach, California).
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